Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
4ebb596176
chore(mirror): mirror tagOnDeploy and the zstart gitPull fix, and stop publishing current product names (#72)
The mirror carries the tagOnDeploy feature, its tests, and the zstart
gitPull fix from the private tree. Twelve published references to
current product names and internal issue numbers are reworded
generically, the denylist learns the current spellings (a dot or hyphen
broke the word, an underscore hid the boundary), and planted cases prove
the suite now sees them. CHECKSUMS.txt regenerated.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 13:40:45 -05:00
40fa250a37
refactor(tests): move the sanitization denylist to a data file both sides can read (#66)
The rules lived inside Sanitization.Tests.ps1, so the publisher in the
private toolkit kept its own second list -- and the two guarded different
things. The publisher's was about SECRETS: keys, private-key blocks, ssh
targets. These are about IDENTITY: internal project names, product domains,
private-only script names, operator paths.

So the publisher reported "clean" on files this suite rejects, and would
have published a tree that fails the public repo's own tests
(evo.scripts#106). Proven at the time by copying the private ZHelpers.ps1
in: two failures naming EvoCivilCode, EvoPlatform and three private-only
script names, against a scan that called the same file clean.

tests/sanitization-patterns.psd1 is now the one source. The suite reads it
and refuses to run if it is missing or empty, rather than passing vacuously
against no rules -- an empty denylist that reports success is the failure
this whole fix is about.

No rule changed. Only where they live.

.psd1 is not in the scanned extension list, which is deliberate and matches
why Sanitization.Tests.ps1 excludes itself: a file that necessarily contains
every pattern it looks for cannot also be scanned for them.

Pester: 240 passed, 0 failed. CHECKSUMS regenerated; changelog and its
plain-text twin updated.
2026-08-31 17:51:23 -05:00
fcbad44e0e
feat(zdeploy): add the static deploy kind, and a test that keeps this repo sanitized (#55)
Two things, both prompted by the same incident.

STATIC KIND
Plain static sites - no build, no container of their own; a shared web
container serves them off disk, so shipping the files IS the deploy.
Directories are staged to a sibling and swapped in with mv rather than
copied in place, because a large media file uploaded in place is served
half-written to anyone who requests it mid-copy. The swap is a rename,
so the switch is atomic.

Skips $JunkDirNames + .github + deploy.skipDirs, matching the docker
kind rather than inventing a third convention.

SANITIZATION TEST
This repo is public and must stay standalone, but the toolkit is
developed in a private checkout and copied here. Twice in three days a
wholesale copy landed carrying real project names, internal hostnames,
host disk figures, and references to scripts that exist only in the
private copy. Both times a human reading the diff caught it - the
control that fails exactly when a diff is 280 lines of good work with
three bad words buried in it.

So it is a test now. Seven rules: private project names, private product
domains, private-only script names, local drive paths, the operator home
path, the real key filename, and any IPv4 outside RFC 5737 documentation
space and the private ranges.

Two anti-vacuity guards, because a denylist that silently matches
nothing is worse than no denylist: one asserts the file scan is
non-empty, and one plants a known violation and requires the pattern to
find it.

The IP rule bounds on [\d.] rather than \d deliberately - this toolkit's
own 5-segment version (v1.0.0.0.14) contains "0.0.0.14", which a plain
digit boundary reads as an address.

Verified against the real unsanitized copy that slipped through: 3 of
the 7 rules fire, naming file and line.

Tests: 231/231 (222 + 9 new). CHECKSUMS.txt refreshed.
2026-08-21 21:43:40 -05:00